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THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT AND
EXCLUSIONARY SUBURBAN ZONING:
FROM BILBAR

TO GIRSH -

A

DECADE OF CHANGE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1926, when the United States Supreme Court, in the landmark
decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' upheld the constitutionality of municipal planning and land use regulations as valid exercises
of the state police power, 2 these activities have gained increasing acceptance
by both communities and courts. Today the power to regulate land use
through zoning and other regulatory schemes is virtually unquestioned.
Traditionally, the courts in Pennsylvania have favored broad unfettered
local government power to plan and regulate land use. But, in the most
recent decade, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has slowly altered its
posture to the point that there now are strong indications that a deep
seated philosophical change has taken place. The long accepted passive
approach is being replaced by activism which allows the judiciary to play
an increasingly major role in the evolution of land use planning.
The problems caused by the unparalleled population growth over
the last decade in both the cities and its immediate environs have placed
tremendous pressure upon the suburban fringe3 to absorb the crush of
people migrating away from the inner cities. However, as the overcrowding
and intolerable living conditions of the cities continue to fuel the suburban
migration, 4 migrating inner city residents have experienced a growing
unconcealed suburban hostility. The settled suburbanites being well satisfied
with their way of life and wishing to maintain the status quo, resent this
threatening influx. They view the pressure of the expanding inner city.
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For a detailed account of the Euclid litigation, see S.

(1969).
2. The opponents of zoning had unsuccessfully argued that it was an unconstitutional taking of property violative of the 14th amendment of the United States
Constitution, which provides in relevant part: "nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
In Pennsylvania, the constitutional validity of zoning was settled in White's
Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926). However, the standard of constitutionality
set forth in White's Appeal which states that a zoning law must be "clearly necessary
to preserve the health, safety or morals of the people," 287 Pa. at 265, has been
modified by the Euclid standard.
3. For purposes of this Comment suburbia will be defined as those small municipalities surrounding the central city which are not yet fully developed nor so close
to the city that they completely share its characteristics. Any more precise definition
TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN

is, in this context, unnecessary.

4. The 1970 United States Census reveals that for the first time in the history
of this country, more people are living in the suburbs than in cities. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 6, 1970, § E, at 5, col. 4.

(507)
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as a threat to the economic and racial character of their particular neighborhood as well as to the maintenance of the current population density.5
Moreover, they are further motivated to resist change by a desire to avoid
the inconveniences and larger tax burdens which invariably follow rapid
growth.6 The focus of the current land use dilemma centers upon the
problems inherent in this basic conflict between suburban residents who
are seeking continued stability in the form of assurances that any further
development of their community will be a continuation of existing low
density uses, primarily consisting of single family residences on large lots, 7
and the non-residents, along with their representatives, the builders, who
are seeking change in the form of suburban construction of commercial
facilities, apartment houses and other high density, high profit, land uses.
Ideally, satisfactory resolution of this conflict should be achieved
through effective use of the zoning power. The goals of each competing
group should be considered with a view toward achieving solutions which
will be acceptable to both. Regretably, however, this has not been the
case. It is generally agreed that the failure of the zoning mechanism
to respond satisfactorily to the demands of this challenge is in large
part attributable to a structural deficiency found in the typical zoning
scheme. 8 Within such a scheme each separately organized governmental
entity is permitted to zone its own land uses without even cursory
consideration to other than local objectives. Because this arrangement
places the zoning machinery in the hands of local interests, the typical
zoning authority has, for the most part, been unresponsive to any pressures
which might run counter to the desire of their narrow constituencies for
stability.9 Given the proclivities of the local interests, it is easily seen why
zoning, which was designed as an engine of change and development,
has been transformed into an effective method of frustrating change.
5. Pressures for apartment development in suburban areas have aroused considerable opposition from suburban residents. The problem is discussed
in Babcock &
Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040
(1963). The authors note both the shouted and the whispered reasons for opposing
apartment development in the suburbs. They list as shouted reasons:
(I) Apartments will not pay their own way in taxes. This argument is usually
directed to the effect on school taxes.
(2) Apartments reduce light and air.
(3) Todays apartments are tomorrows slums.
(4) Apartments will reduce property values.
(5) Apartments will injure the character of the area.
As whispered reasons, the authors list:
(1) Lower class elements will be attracted by apartments.
(2) Multi-family housing will attract transients who have no interest in
the community.
(3) And Negroes.
6. Id.
7. "Large" lot zoning is an extremely relative concept. See, id., at 1059-62;
Note, Large Lot Zoninq, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969). But, as will be seen, the major
litigation challenging large lot zoning in Pennsylvania has thus far been concerned
with minimum building lot requirements of more than one acre.
8.

See, e.g., AMERICAN

SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PROBLEMS OF ZONING

AND LAND USE REGULATION (1968), one of a series of research reports prepared for

the National Commission on Urban Problems.
9. Id. at 14.
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The only effective counterweight to local zoning power which is
available to community non-residents and land developers is the constitutional guarantee that all zoning regulations must "bear a substantial relation10
ship to the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the community."
Since this constitutional guarantee is the only restriction on the discretion
of the local zoning authority, the strength of the outsider's position
vis a vis the local interests is the direct function of the interpretation
given to this limitation by the courts. Over the last decade, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a series of decisions has effected a thoroughgoing change in the judicial interpretation of the constitutionally permissible
limits of zoning as an exercise of state police power. The result of this
re-examination has been a shift in the traditional balance of power between
the local interests and the developers. The focus of this Comment will
be an examination of this emerging body of case law and an analysis of
its impact on land use planning in Pennsylvania.
II.

BACKGROUND

The usual procedure employed for the implementation of zoning
power has been through ordinances passed by municipal governments
under the authorization of a state enabling act. Under the initial Pennsylvania enabling statute," which was modeled after the Standard State
Enabling Act of the United States Department of Commerce, 12 there was
to be an administrator, often the building inspector, who was to supply
the day to day application of the legislatively approved ordinance. The
function of the administrator was to issue building permits in appropriate
cases. In addition, there was provision for: (1) a planning commission
whose function was to advise on the enactment and amendment of the
original ordinance; and (2) the board of adjustment, also known as a
board of zoning appeals, which was created to act as a safety valve for
the zoning ordinance by providing administrative relief from its operation
in proper circumstances. 1 These groups were to work together as a
10. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).

See

note 1 supra.
11. Until recently the Pennsylvania enabling statutes were a hopeless morass of
ad hoc solutions to pressing difficulties. The bulk of these statutes were recently

replaced by the Municipalities Planning Act [hereinafter cited as M.P.A.]. PA. STAT.
tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Supp. 1969), which encompasses Act of Assembly No. 247,
approved July 31, 1968, effective January 1, 1969. For citation to the former enabling
provisions of the Borough Code, First Class Township Code, Third Class City Code,
Second Class Township Code, Second Class County Code and County Code, see
repealer M.P.A. PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 11201 (Supp. 1969).
12. This act is reprinted in 3A RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 100-1 (3d
ed. 1956). The act was published in final form in 1926 and immediately exerted wide
influence. By the end of 1927, some twenty-nine states had adopted zoning enabling
legislation based to a large extent on the standard act. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SURVEY OF ZONING LAWS AND ORDINANCES 10 (1928) ; Haar, "In
A Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).

Accordance With

13. What was to be deemed "proper circumstances" was, within constitutional
limits solely a matter of administrative discretion. For a commentary on the difficulties inherent in this entire structural arrangement, see Mandelker, Delegation of
Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60, 61-65.
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coordinated unit for the singular purpose of providing a workable plan
of orderly land development.
Within this framework, litigation challenging a zoning decision could
arise in several ways and take many forms. Historically, in Pennsylvania,
zoning challenges can be categorized as follows: (1) applications for
special exceptions; (2) requests for true variances; (3) constitutional
challenge to a zoning ordinance because it results in an unfair taking as
applied to a specific piece of property; and (4) a constitutional challenge
14
to the zoning ordinance as applied to all the land within its scope.
A special exception is generally defined as a use legislatively allowed by
the ordinance subject only to specific approval by the board of adjustment. 15
Typically, a use which is the subject of a special exception demands a
large amount of land, may be public or semipublic in character and might
often be noxious or offensive. However, not all of these characteristics
need apply to every use. Hospitals or schools in residential districts are
an example of a special exception. They may adversely affect a residential
neighborhood because of the extensive area they occupy and the potential
traffic problems and other difficulties they may create. A filling station
in a light commercial district because of its potentially noxious effects is
another example of this use. 16 In cases involving a special exception, the
burden of proof is upon the municipality to establish that the requested use
17
will have an adverse effect on public health or safety.
A variance is defined as an administratively authorized departure from
the terms of a zoning ordinance granted in cases of unique and individual
hardship in which a strict application of the terms of the ordinance
would be unconstitutional.18 Approval of a request for a variance quite
obviously results in a land use previously prohibited. The change, however, has been affected through use of the administrative machinery.
This is in contrast to an amendment which is a zoning change secured
through legislative action. In theory, the variance procedure is to be
used for changes involving the use of single pieces of property whereas
a zoning amendment is proper only in response to substantial changes
in environmental conditions, or in other instances indicating a policy
change. 19 Use of amendments to accommodate limited changes in use,
usually confined to one lot is a technique which is disapprovingly called
20
spot zoning.
14. See deFuria, Zoning - A Review and Suggestions, 39 PA. B. Ass'N Q.
286 (1960).
15. Id. at 290; Mandelker, supra note 13, at 63.
16. Mandelker, supra note 13, at 63.
17. See, e.g., Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957);
Borden Appeal, 369 Pa. 517, 87 A.2d 465 (1952).
18. Haar, "In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L. REv. 1154,
1156 (1955).
19. deFuria, supra note 14, at 293; Mandelker, supra note 13, at 62-63.
20. See 1 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 26-1 (3d ed. 1956), which defines
spot zoning as:

[Tihe practice whereby a single lot or area is granted privileges which are not

granted or extended to other land in the vicinity in the same use district. It is

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss3/3

4

Nilon: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Suburban Zoning:

MARCH

1971]

CoNI[MENTS

The third and fourth categories of litigation involve constitutional
challenges of a zoning ordinance in its application to a specific piece of
real estate or as it applies to all the land subject to its operation. These
cases raise the question of the constitutionality of either the substantive
provisions of a particular ordinance or the procedure employed in the
enactment or amendment of the ordinance.2 1 The theory of the challenge
is not that the ordinance or the procedure results in any undue hardship
peculiar to a property, but rather that the zoning action results in a taking
which bears no substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of the community, 22 and is therefore ultra vires the
23
statutory authority.
The cases have not always managed to distinguish clearly between
a challenge to the administrative decision on a variance request and a
true constitutional challenge.2 4 This confusion is in large measure due
to the fact that a variance, although an administrative remedy, is in itself
a form of constitutional challenge. The difference is that a variance request
challenges the ordinance because, as applied to a specific piece of property,
the ordinance operates to create an undue hardship which is peculiar to
that property. By contrast, a true constitutional challenge is a challenge
to the scope of the statutory authority regardless of the existence of a
particular hardship, and may challenge the operation of the ordinance
as applied to a specific piece of property as well as the application of the
25
ordinance to all of the land within its purview.
also, but more rarely, used to describe the reverse proposition, that is, one in
which a single lot has burdens imposed upon it which are more rigid than those
imposed upon other properties within the same district.
21. deFuria, supra note 14; Mandelker, supra note 13.
22. This is, of course, the standard of constitutional due process announced in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See note 1 supra.
23. Haar, supra note 18, at 1156.
24. deFuria, supra note 14, at 292.
25. An example may serve to illustrate the distinction. X was owner of a one
acre tract on which he wished to construct a single-family residence. Under the terms
of the local ordinance the minimum lot required for a single-family residence was one
acre. There was also a requirement that any dwelling constructed on a one acre lot
must be set back fifty feet from the property line on all sides. X's property had a
small stream running across it on one side which made it impossible to construct a
residence on the land and still conform to the set back requirement. In this circumstance, X would apply to the zoning board of adjustment for relief from the set back
requirement because that term of the ordinance operated to create a hardship unique
and peculiar to his property. This would be a request for a variance.
Assume now that X's one acre property was in no way differentiated from
any other plot in the area. The local ordinance once again required a one acre
minimum building lot and a fifty foot setback. This time X, a developer, wishes to
utilize the land by constructing four single-family residences on quarter acre plots.
In seeking to avoid the one acre minimum building lot requirement, X would challenge the validity of the ordinance as being beyond the constitutionally permissible
limits of the zoning power. This would be a true constitutional challenge.
In National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 505, 511-12, 215 A.2d 597, 602 (1965), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court at last made clear its position on this distinction. The court stated:
In essence, an application for a variance implies a challenge to the legality of
the zoning ordinance as it applies to a specific piece of property. See Forest Hills
Borough Appeal, 409 Pa. 392, 187 A.2d 166 (1963); Colligan Zoning Case, 401
Pa. 125, 162 A.2d 652 (1960) ; Baronoff v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 385 Pa.
110, 122 A.2d 65 (1956) ; Garbev Zoning Case, 385 Pa. 328, 122 A.2d 682 (1956).
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The thrust of this Comment is to examine the judicially established
constitutional limits of local zoning power. Consequently, the cases discussed
herein will treat challenges to the statutory authority - constitutional
challenges - and challenges to the granting or denial of variances without
differentiation. Within the context of this discussion, only the result circumscription of the local legislative power - is of relevance.
III.

THE EARLIER CASES

Appeal,26

White's
which was the first important Pennsylvania zoning
case, held that the exercise of the police power under auspices of a zoning
ordinance is valid only if the ordinance bears a substantial relationship
to the public good within the proper spheres, i.e., the preservation of health,
safety and general welfare, and that any invasion of constitutionally
protected rights must be strictly construed. More recently in Lord Appeal 2 '
and later in Medinger Appeal 28 it was said that while zoning ordinances
are valid and constitutional, in order to be enforceable in a particular case
certain definite standards must be met. These cases held that a zoning
ordinance must be: (1) necessary for reasons of public health, safety,
morals or general welfare, i.e., the ordinance must be a proper exercise
of the police power; (2) it must not be unjustly discriminatory, arbitrary
or unreasonable; (3) it must not be confiscatory; and (4) it must operate
uniformly within a zoning district. 29
Despite the restrictive tenor of this language it is fair to say that,
in a practical sense at least, the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court until 1960 permitted unfettered exercise of broad local governmental
Zoning is permitted when exercised for the promotion of the health, safety, morals
or general welfare of the community. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926) ; Cleaver v. Bd. of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d
408 (1964) ; Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957). Such
an exercise of the police power, however, may, in applications of the ordinance
to specific properties, impose upon the owner of such properties an "unnecessary
hardship." When so applied, the ordinance cannot be termed a reasonable or
constitutional exercise of the police power. To preserve the validity of the zoning ordinance in its application to the community in general, therefore, the
variance provision of the enabling act functions as an "escape valve" so that
when regulations which apply to all are unnecessarily burdensome to a few
because of certain unique circumstances, a means of relief from the mandates of
the ordinance is provided. See Pierce v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 Pa. 262,
267, 189 A.2d 138, 141 (1963) ; Colligan Zoning Case, 401 Pa. 125, 131-32, 162
A.2d 652, 655 (1960). It can be understood, then, if a request for a variance
is denied, indicating that there is nothing about petitioner's land or his hardship
that is any different than that of everyone else with land similarly zoned, then
petitioner's most logical next step is to attack the validity of the ordinance as
it applies to everyone. See Anstine v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33,
190 A.2d 712 (1963) ; Sylvester v. Pittsburgh Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 398
Pa. 216, 157 A.2d 174 (1959) ; Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106,
141 A.2d 606 (1958) ; Schmalz v. Buckingham Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
389 Pa. 295, 132 A.2d 233 (1957) ; Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31, 87 A.2d 299 (1952).
In other words, a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance is a natural and
foreseeable outgrowth of a request for a variance.
26. 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
27. 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533 (1951).
28. 377 Pa.217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954).
29. deFuria, supra note 14, at 287-89.
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powers.3 0 The truly permissive attitude of the court was made explicit in
Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment s '
where the constitutionality of one acre minimum lot zoning was challenged.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld both the zoning board of adjustment and the lower court stating that a zoning ordinance may be sustained
solely on considerations of general welfare, even though the ordinance
bears no reasonable relationship to the health, safety, or morals of the
community. 2 As Mr. Justice Bell pointed out in an extensive and vigorous
dissent, the effect of this holding was to create a doctrine of unlimited
police power.33
The Bilbar decision followed the per curiam opinion in Swade v.
Springfield Township,3 4 which was an appeal concerning the denial of an
application for a variance to permit business use of a residential zone.
The property owner offered evidence to show that the intended use of
the property would have no adverse effect on public health or safety and
that there was no relation between the regulation and lawful objects of
the police power. The supreme court adopted the opinion of the lower
court, rejecting this contention, stating that if appellant's argument was
adopted:
[B]usiness and industry could invade any zone just so long as it
could be shown that the proposed use would not adversely affect to
any reasonable extent the public health, safety or morals. The statutory
law of zoning would be replaced by the law of nuisance. s
Reading these cases together clearly indicates that at this time the
posture of the court majority regarding zoning matters is best characterized
as reluctant participation. The court seems to have taken the position that
zoning ordinances were legislative enactments passed by duly elected
representatives and that it should be wary of substituting its substantive
judgment for that of the zoning authority. 36 The result of this jurisprudential philosophy was that a zoning decision would be reversed by
the court only when it involved a most flagrant abuse of discretion.3 7
30. Id. at 286.
31. 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).

For complete discussion of the Bilbar

case and a comtemporary assessment of its impact, see

THE COMMUNITIES RESEARCH
INSTITUTE PROJECT, VILLANOVA SCHOOL OF LAW, ZONING FOR MINIMUM LOT AREA

(2d ed., J. Stephenson III, 1959).
32. Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa.
62, 74, 141 A.2d 851, 857 (1958).
33. Id. at 78, 141 A.2d at 859.
34. 392 Pa. 269, 140 A.2d 597 (1958).
35. Id. at 271, 140 A.2d at 598 (emphasis added).
36. See also Tidewater Oil Co. v. Poore, 395 Pa. 89, 149 A.2d 636 (1959);
Harrisburg v. Pass, 372 Pa. 318, 93 A.2d 447 (1953).
37. See, e.g., Baronoff v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 385 Pa. 110, 122 A.2d 65
(1956), wherein the Supreme Court reversed the board of adjustment's refusal to
grant a variance to permit a commercial use to the owner of a landlocked parcel
abutting another township. With the variance the parcel could be used profitably
in conjunction with the parcel in the next township for a drive-in movie theater.
Without the variance it was useless.
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The Bilbar and Swade cases are the high water mark of broad
unfettered local zoning power.38 From this point in 1960 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court began an evolutionary process in which it moved away
from its traditional posture with the purpose of developing meaningful
limitations upon the exercise of local discretion.
IV.

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH A COMPREHENSIVE

PLAN"

-

A SEARCH FOR STANDARDS
The command that zoning enactments must be made "in accordance
with a comprehensive plan" or words of similar import is contained in

virtually all zoning enabling legislation. This limitation upon the exercise
of statutory authority exists so that the legislation might pass constitutional
standards - i.e., bear a reasonable relationship to the health, morals,
safety or general welfare of the community.89 It is therefore not surprising
that the initial attempts at meaningful proscription of discretionary power
of the local zoning boards was approached through reference to this
limitation. The following section is an examination of the results of
these early cases.
A.

The Rule of Eves

Although the language "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" is
as old as zoning legislation itself, the first meaningful Pennsylvania
Supreme Court4 ° treatment of the phrase came in the 1960 case of Eves
v. Zoning Board of Adjustment.41 In 1958 the Board of Supervisors of
Lower Gwynedd Township adopted Ordinance 28 which officially amended
the general zoning ordinance of the township to provide for a new zoning

district known as "F-1 Limited Industrial District." The industrial use

42
sanctioned in this district was hedged with numerous terms and conditions.
The novel provision of Ordinance 28, and the one which became the

focus of litigation, was the failure of the ordinance to delineate the boundaries of those specific areas which were to be classified as "F-I" districts.
Instead, the Ordinance outlined a procedure whereby anyone could submit
to the board of adjustment an application, together with appropriate plans,
requesting that his land be rezoned to "F-I." The Board, after proper
38. See also Tidewater Oil Co. v. Poore, 395 Pa. 89, 149 A.2d 636 (1959)
deFuria, supra note 14.
39. Haar, supra note 18.
40. The Pennsylvania Superior Court in 1954 grappled with the question in
Putney v. Abington Township, 176 Pa. Super. 463, 108 A.2d 134 (1954). Note,
Zoning Law, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 277 (1966).
41. 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
42. Of every development, the plan required, inter alia, construction in accordance
with an overall plan; integrated architecture; a minimum site of twenty-five acres,
of which no more than ten per cent could be occupied with buildings; appropriate
landscaping, as well as parking and ingress and egress facilities; and a buffer strip
insulating the public streets. Id. at 212-14, 164 A.2d at 8-9.
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consultation with the planning commission and public hearings, would
43
then decide whether to grant or reject the requested change.
The question as presented to the supreme court was to determine
if this zoning technique, aptly termed "flexible selective zoning," was
within contemplation of the "comprehensive plan" language of the enabling
act. The court held the Ordinance invalid and then commented:
Appellees vigorously contend that a comprehensive plan does
exist for the Township of Lower Gwynedd and is set forth in the
record. Essentially, appellees argue, the plan contemplates a "greenbelt" township predominantly residential in character with a certain
amount of compatible non-residential occupancy consisting of shopping
centers, research and engineering centers and limited industrial uses.
It also contemplates that these non-residential uses shall be strictly
controlled as to setback, building area, noise, smoke, sewage disposal,
etc., and the means of such control shall be vested in the supervisors
through strict ordinances of general application such as Ordinance
28, supra, setting up the requirements and limitations on limited
industrial uses. In turn, these tools of control and minimum standards
are to be the polestars (along with other factors, such as the proximity
of through highways, availability of adequate streams for effluent
disposal, etc.), in any further consideration to be given by the planning
commission and the supervisors to applications for specific locations
or areas. By adopting this approach, the appellees have confused
comprehensive planning with a comprehensive plan. The foregoing
are certainly the rudiments and fundamentals which enter into the
promulgation of a planned zoning scheme for the township. They
are, however, only the most preliminary and basic considerations from
which the ultimate decision of selective land uses are to be made.
Until such time, no final formulation exists which satisfies the
"comprehensive plan" requirement within the meaning of the enabling
44
legislation.
The ever present problem in zoning a community which contains
undeveloped ground is anticipating the future needs of the populace.
While this task is difficult, its corollary, the problem of predicting which
owners of currently undeveloped land are going to be willing to sell
their parcels so that an area zoned, for example, light industrial may
develop as such, is virtually impossible. Ordinance 28 through its floating
zone arrangement represented an imaginative attempt at resolution of this
dilemma and the Eves decision, because it invalidated this device, has
45
been criticized as an inflexible approach to a very difficult problem.
Nevertheless, one need not be too familiar with the zoning process to
realize that the Lower Gwynedd scheme in operation, because of its
unprecedented flexibility, represented a tremendous opportunity for local
officials to permit or deny industrial zoning changes based on favoritism
43.
44.
45.
Or An

Id.
Id. at 218-19, 164 A.2d at 11.
Haar & Hering, The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning
Inflexible Judiciary?, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1552 (1961).
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or even worse, graft, without any fear of censure by the courts. Any
decision that local zoning officials made could be easily justified under the
nebulous criteria of the ordinance. It was this unfettered discretion which
flexible selective zoning would allow the local board of adjustment, rather
than any aversion to flexibility, that caused the court to declare this method
of zoning invalid.
B.

The Rule of Key Realty

The second major case attempting to define guidelines for legislative
and administrative zoning action was Appeal of Key Realty.4" Under the
facts of this case appellant, Key Realty, had purchased two lots in an
area which permitted apartment uses. On one lot was a large single
family residence which appellant converted into an apartment. The'appellant
made application for a permit to erect a second apartment on the other
lot which was vacant. The application was denied 47 and, while a second
application was pending, the borough zoning ordinance was amended,
upgrading the area to permit only single family detached dwellings. The
appellant, on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, challenged the
validity of the amendatory ordinance in so far as the borough council
did not adopt it "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" nor with
"reasonable consideration . . . to the character of the district. ' 48
In an opinion by Justice Cohen, who had also written the majority
opinion in Eves, the court upheld the validity of the amendment to the
ordinance as a proper exercise of the local zoning board's authority. The
court distinguished the practice in Key Realty from the "flexible selecting
zoning" of Eves stating that:
Selection of individual properties or groups of properties for
rezoning, even if authorized by an ordinance, is not in compliance
with the statutory mandate that zoning regulations must be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." To fulfill this requirement, zoning
legislation must reflect and implement the totality of a municipality's
program of land utilization, considering both the land resources
available and the needs and desires of the community. This does
not contemplate a rigid "master-plan" which attempts to answer in
minute detail every last question regarding land utilization; whether
that plan be formulated by a planning commission or by the zoning
ordinance itself. Nor, on the other hand, should it be, as in Eves,
loose legislation permissive of ad hoc determinations of the49 land
utilization of comparatively small sections of the community.
The proper degree of flexibility then is somewhere between the unbridled
discretion of Eves and the rigidity of a fixed master plan. The court
46. 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962).

47. The first application for erection of an apartment structure was denied because
the side yard requirements of the borough zoning ordinance would not be met by the
proposed structure. Id. at 99, 182 A.2d at 188.
48. Id. at 100, 182 A.2d at 188.
49. Id. at 100-01, 182 A.2d at 189.
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posited that the amendatory scheme in Key Realty was within this spectrum,
but failed to furnish any positive criteria to explain why.
C. The Rule of Donahue
Further confusion as to the true degree of permissable flexibility was
supplied by the supreme court's decision in Donahue v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment. 50 In January 1962 the zoning ordinance of Whitemarsh
Township was amended to authorize, for the first time, a residential "Apartment House District." Although the ordinance sufficiently described the new
use, it did not designate a specific area which would be subject to the
new classification. A group of neighboring land owners challenged the
validity of this procedure grounding their argument on the authority of
Eves. Two issues were presented for the court's determination: (1) was this
a "floating zone" arrangement sufficiently analogous to the one condemned
in Eves and therefore prohibited; and (2) was the change in zoning effected
pursuant to the goals of a comprehensive plan.51 The court upheld the
ordinance on the first count distinguishing the practice in the instant case
from the prohibition of floating zones saying that "[i]t was the case by
case review [in Eves] which demonstrated the absence of a comprehensive
plan."'52 The latter issue of the amendatory process conformity to the statutory and constitutional requirements of a comprehensive plan was answered
simply by reference to the above quoted passage from the Key Realty
53
holding.
While the court in Donahue, just as in Key Realty, attempted to
distinguish the procedure in these cases from the forbidden floating zone
of Eves, it is difficult to see how in actual operation they are in any manner
different. The net effect sought to be achieved in each instance was broad
legislative discretion for the local zoning board. In Eves the court condemned the scheme, whereas in Donahue and Key Realty the zoning
changes were allowed to stand. The reasonable conclusion, that seems to
flow from this contradiction is that either Eves has been undermined almost
out of existence or there is a ground for its distinction which the court has
failed to make explicit.
D. An Emerging Rationale
In comparing the court's solutions to the zoning questions presented
by the various cases and attempting to formulate some workable rationale
from them, much insight can be gained from the observation of a single
factual circumstance. If the proposed zoning change before the court involved an increase in the restrictions on use of the land in question, the
decision of the zoning board would be given less scrutiny and be less likely
50.
51.
52.
53.

412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963).
Id. at 334-35, 194 A.2d at 611.
Id.
Id. at 335, 194 A.2d at 612, quoted infra, p. 516.
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to be overturned than if the zoning change operated to decrease the
restrictions on the property. The complaining parties in Eves were the
neighboring land owners. They considered themselves aggrieved because
the proposed zoning of the adjacent property from residential to limited
industrial was a decrease in restriction as to that piece of property. The
net result of the change was an increase in the value of the land zoned light
industrial and a decrease in the market value of the surrounding residential
properties. This type of zoning change in which there is a decrease in
restrictions is called a down zoning. 54 Conversely, in Key Realty, 55 the
zoning change was an increase in restriction from multi family residential
to single family residential. This change is termed an upgrading of land
use or up zoning.56 It usually results in a decrease in the sale value or
commercial utility of particular properties but, because it makes the community a more desirable place to live, works a benefit on the community
as a whole. Traditionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in reviewing
the validity of zoning decisions, has weighed the burden placed upon the
individual property owner against the benefit to the community interests
arising out of the zoning restriction. The decision of the local zoning
authority has always been given substantial weight in this balancing
process under the presumption that the local legislative or administrative
action was in itself best evidence of the community interest. However, a
planning decision, such as the down zoning in Eves, which works a benefit
to the land directly involved at the expense of neighboring property may
involve at least favoritism. A court in this situation can not presume that
the decision of the local authority is in the best interests of the community
without presuming away the very issue presented. 57 Consequently, for
a court to exercise any sort of judicial review in the down zoning circumstance, it must be offered a realistic alternative to the blind presumption that the action taken is in the best interests of the community. Cognition of this almost self evident fact was the first evidence of an increasingly
activist philosophy on the part of the court and it is the thread which reconciles the seemingly incongruous results of Eves, Key Realty and Donahue.
In Eves there was a down zoning and the court in that circumstance
was given no ascertainable standard against which to measure the reasonableness of the change. Consequently the scheme was disallowed. The
apartment use requested in Donahue was, like Eves, a down zoning. It is
argued that the divergent result between these cases is not attributable
to any per se objection to a "floating zone," but rather to any system of
flexible zoning which in operation would extend to the zoning authority
virtually unfettered discretion in reviewing requests and mapping future
development. The ordinance in Donahue, although nearly as flexible as the
54. See

URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL

Tech. Bull. 52, 20-22 (1965).
55. 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962).

DEVELOPMENT,

56. LEGAL
at 20-22.

ASPECTS OF PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT, Supra note

54,

57. Cf. id. at 17.
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invalidated Eves ordinance, did at least provide, through a declaration of
intent, 5s a specific measurable criteria against which to judge the reasonableness of the zoning change. In Eves there was nothing comparable.5 9
In seeking to define "comprehensive plan," the court is attempting to
establish the parameters of a workable alternative to the presumption that
local zoning authority action is in best interest of the community. Under this
rationale it would be reasonable to conclude that when faced with review
of a zoning decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in order to exercise
meaningful review, would look to a "comprehensive plan" - an alternative
to the blind presumption that the decision of the local zoning authority
was in the best interests of the community - against which to measure
the specific result obtained in any case. Because of the dangers of malfeasance implicit in a down zoning situation, the courts would seek a more
definite objective standard than would be necessary if the rezoning was
an increase in land restrictions.
In the converse situation, i.e., an up zoning or increase in restriction,
such as Key Realty, the court at this stage is less inclined to risk usurpation of legislative and administrative judgment. Deficiencies in planning
can be bolstered by the presumption that the zoning authority is acting
in the best interests of the community.6"
The court's decision since Donahue and Key Realty further substantiate this view. In Furness v. Lower Merian Township,6' decided one
month after Donahue, a down zoning to apartment use was permitted because according to the court there existed a previously adopted comprehensive plan. Shortly afterward in Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment 62 the
supreme court similarly allowed a down zoning because of the existence
of the sought after alternative - a previously adopted comprehensive plan
for area development. Both of these decisions demonstrate that the court
is willing to permit great flexibility so long as there exists a basis against
which the reasonableness of any change may be measured. In both cases
there existed a legally sufficient comprehensive plan and, similarly, the zoning adopted in both was a deviation from the comprehensive plan. But in
each case there existed the possibility of measuring the "reasonableness"
of the change and it was therefore permitted. Surely, it can not be said that
58. Donahue v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 412 Pa. 332, 336 n.5, 194 A.2d 610,
612 n.5 (1963).

59. Eves is further distinguishable from Donahue on the grounds that Eves

concerned a request for an industrial rezoning while Donahue involved a change from
one residential use to another. Although this distinction is not believed paramount,
one commentator has interpreted the concern with an "industrial" floating zone to
be the distinguishing factor of Eves. See Johnston, Developments in Land Use
Control, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 399 (1970).
60. See Upper Darby Township Appeal, 413 Pa. 583, 198 A.2d 538 (1964). The
presumption, of course, is open to proof. See Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternal,
418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d 514 (1965).
61. 412 Pa. 404, 194 A.2d 926 (1963).
62. 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).
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these permitted techniques are any less flexible than the "floating zone"
of Eves. 63

The string of cases from 1960 to 1964 - Eves through Cleaver firmly established the following propositions: (1) actions by a local zoning
authority were valid only when there existed a "comprehensive plan"
against which such actions could be judged for purposes of determining
their reasonableness; and (2) the comprehensive plan may be a single
written embodiment of planning goals or, in the absence of a document,
the plan may be evidenced by the prior and current zoning enactments
of the locale. 64 In addition, it was tentatively established that the court
would be less likely to reverse the local authority when their decision was
to up zone a property than when the decision was to down zone. As
will be pointed out later, however, the presumption in favor of up zoning
was an impermanent one. It was now evident that the court would no
longer tolerate vague defenses couched in terms of general welfare and
public good as a justification for zoning changes, or eschew a major role
in determining their validity.
V.

DEFINING THE OUTER LIMITS

After 1964 the focus of major zoning litigation shifted from the
search for a workable definition of when a "comprehensive plan" exists
to a case by case delineation of the constitutional limitations upon the
substantive provisions of a plan.
The following review of these cases will serve to demonstrate the
marked degree to which the court has involved itself into the substantive
issues of zoning questions.
A.

National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown
65
Township Board of Adjustment.

In 1965, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again was presented with
an opportunity to address itself to the problem of the permissible limits
of minimum lot zoning. 66 Under the facts presented to the court, the
titleholder of an eighty-five acre tract in Easttown Township known as
"Sweetbriar" agreed in 1961 to sell the property to the National Land and
Investment Co. At the time of the purchase agreement the zoning for
"Sweetbriar", as well as the vast majority of the township, required a one
acre minimum area for each building lot. However, in early 1962, shortly
after the purchase by National an amendment to the zoning ordinance in63. As evidence that, in the absence of an alternative, the court will limit the
scope of flexibility in a down zoning, see Salvetti v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 429
Pa. 330, 240 A.2d 534 (1968) ; Mulac Appeal, 418 Pa. 207, 210 A.2d 275 (1965).
64. Cf. Note, Zoning Law, 27 U. PITT. L. REv. 277, 281 (1966).
65. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
66. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously upheld the constitutionality
of the Easttown Township one acre minimum building lot requirement in Bilbar
Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851
(1958), discussed at p.513 supra.
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creased the minimum lot requirement from one acre to four acres. As a
challenge to this amendment, National applied for a building permit to construct a single family dwelling upon one acre of the tract. After receipt of
formal refusal from the zoning officer, National served notice that they
would appeal to the zoning board of adjustment for, in their terms, "a
variance from the terms of the ordinance." Six months later, after no
action had been taken by the zoning authorities, National requested a hearing on their appeal in support of which they filed a statement of appeal
with the zoning board. In this statement of appeal National revised its
theory of the case from a request for a variance to a direct challenge of
the constitutionality of the four acre minimum lot requirement. In an
opinion by Justice Roberts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after disposing of the procedural issues presented, 67 found that on the particular
facts before the court the four acre minimum lot requirement of the
Easttown Township zoning ordinance was not constitutional. The court
explicitly refused, however, to find a four acre minimum residential lot
requirement unconstitutional per se68 emphasizing instead the changeable
nature of land utilities and the consequent variable nature of proper
circumstances justifying subjugation to public control through use of the
police power. The court specifically stated that:
At some point along the spectrum, however, the size of lots ceases to
be a concern requiring public regulation and becomes simply a matter
of private preference. The point at which legitimate public interest
ceases is not a constant one, but one which varies with the land involved and the circumstances of each case.6 9
The analysis employed in reaching the conclusions in National Land
purports to be a demonstration that the arguments of the zoning authority
provide no justification for their decision and, therefore, the zoning fails
the constitutional test of reasonable relationship to the health, safety, morals
and general welfare. But to glean meaningful precedent from National Land,
an analytical inquiry must go beyond a mere recanting of the conjunctive
criteria which were deemed sufficient by the court to constitute unlawful
invasion of private rights. The key to the true decisional basis of National
Land may be found through an examination of the fundamental balancing
of interests approach employed by the court in reaching its result. Under
this approach the court identifies the interests of the parties and then
fashions the result by weighing one against the other. The interests implicitly identified by Justice Roberts are: (1) the pecuniary interest of the
67. At the time the National Land case went to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court there existed a substantial procedural question regarding the propriety of first
filing a request for a variance and then prosecuting an appeal under the theory of a

constitutional challenge. The court held the procedure valid and then used the opportunity to elaborate on the proper relationship between an application for a variance
and a constitutional challenge. See note 25 supra.
68. National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment,
419 Pa. 504, 523, 215 A.2d 597, 608 (1965).
69. Id. at 524, 215 A.2d at 608.
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landowner-litigant;70 (2) the interest of the community in regulating its
own affairs; and (3) the interest of community non-residents who are
or will be affected by a zoning practice that has the effect of shifting a
population burden from one community to another. 71 As applied to the
facts of National Land, the pecuniary loss assessable to the owner of
"Sweetbriar" is used as a touchstone against which the arguments of the
Township are placed singularly and cumulatively as counter balances. The
third factor then added to the equation is the interest of community nonresidents i.e., the outsiders seeking entrance. It is the presence of this third
interest which colors the court's assessment of the proper weight to be given
to the arguments of the other two interests.
Mindful of the influencing factor of the outsider interest, an examination of the Township's contentions made on behalf of the zoning restrictions and the treatment of these arguments by the court is illuminating.
Initially the appellants (Township) argued that the added population
occasioned by the new development will jeopardize the workability of
the current system of sewerage disposal and consequently increase the
danger of water pollution. 72 Besides indicating that the Township did
not meet its burden of proof on this point, the court affirmatively stated
that the basis for rejecting this argument was its lack of relevance. The
court stated:
We can not help but note also that the Second Class Township
Code provides for establishing sanitary regulations which can be enforced by a "sanitary board" regardless of the zoning for the area. The

Code also provides for the installation and maintenance of sewer systems but the township has made no plan in this regard. In addition,
under the township subdivision regulations, the zoning officer may
require lots larger than the minimum permitted by the zoning ordinance if the result of percolation tests upon the land show that a
larger land area is needed for proper drainage and disposal of sewage.
These legislatively sanctioned methods for dealing with the sewage
problem compel the conclusion that a four acre minimum is neither
a necessary nor a reasonable method
by which Easttown can protect
7 3
itself from the menace of pollution.
70. Id. at 524, 215 A.2d at 608. The potential loss to the defendants because of
the larger lot requirement was conservatively estimated at $85,000.00. In addition to
reducing the number of available building lots, there was substantial proof that the
marketability of the remaining lots was substantially impaired. It would seem that
if a zoning ordinance had no relationship to the health, safety, morals and general
welfare of a community then it would be unconstitutional without further inquiry.
Nevertheless, courts seem to feel a need to have the pecuniary loss established, which
lends insight into the true balancing nature of case law results.
71. The very real interest of the non-residents in the zoning decisions of a local

municipality has become the subject of a number of recent studies and articles. See,
e.g., AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PROBLEMS OF ZONING AND LAND

(1968); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Suburban Zoning
Ordinances and Building Codes: Their Effect on Low and Moderate Income Housing,
45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 123 (1969); Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418
(1969); Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970).
72. 419 Pa. at 525, 215 A.2d at 608.
73. Id. at 526, 215 A.2d at 609 (emphasis added).
USE REGULATION
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The Township also advanced two additional arguments that: (1) the zoning was necessary to avoid an overburdening of the local roads7 4 ; and (2)
aesthetic objectives justified the zoning decisions. 75 Both of these arguments were rejected by the court as being unpersuasive. While the court
pretended not to foreclose the possibility that the justifications advanced by
the township when taken together might, under some circumstances, be
sufficient, it is submitted that under circumstances where the purpose or
effect of a zoning classification is to unreasonably exclude people and retard
development these reasons will never be sufficient. In National Land, the
truly persuasive interest was the court's assessment of the certain deleterious impact of unbridled local discretion in making zoning determinations upon community non-residents. It is further submitted that
judicial concern for this unrepresented yet substantial interest will prove
to be virtually conclusive and that arguments marshalled on behalf of a
a decision adversely affecting this interest will in the future be required
to significantly exceed the justifications advanced in National.
The assessment of the substantial weight given by the court to the
unrepresented interest of the community non-resident finds support in the
following statements of Justice Roberts:
Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which enables
them to more effectively meet the demands of evolving and growing
communities. It must not and can not be used by those officials as an
instrument by which they may shirk their responsibilities. Zoning is
a means by which a governmental body can plan for the future - it
may not be used as a means to deny the future. .

.

. A zoning

ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of
newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise,
upon the 76
administration of public services and facilities can not be
held valid.
A rationale under which non-residents have an interest in the zoning
decisions of a community is by no means novel. 77 But until recently the
concept was only given scant consideration both in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. However, with courts and others becoming increasingly aware
of the widespread social consequences of suburban zoning practices, 78 it was
hardly bold at the time to predict an increase in this approach. A comparison of the 1958 decision in Bilbar v. Easttown Township79 with
National Land lends further credence to the conclusion that it was the
74. Id. at 528, 215 A.2d at 610.
75. Id. at 529, 215 A.2d at 610. For a full discussion of the controversy which
formerly raged over the problem of zoning for aesthetics, see Dukeminier, Zoning
for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955).
76. 419 Pa. at 527-28, 532, 215 A.2d at 610, 612. See also Community College
of Delaware County Appeal, 435 Pa. 264, 254 A.2d 641 (1969).
77. The point was raised by appellees in Village of Euclid Litigation Brief for
Appellee at 42-43, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 376 (1926), cited in
Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896, 911 (1970).
78. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS (1968). See also note 76 supra.
79. 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958). See note 31 supra.
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meaningful recognition of this third party interest which proved persuasive. This new found recognition coupled with the court's willingness to
decide cases on their merits rather than abstaining through the use of
antiquated and unrealistic presumptions will provide the framework for
the courts further refinement of the limitations upon legislative and administrative discretion.
B.

Concord Township Appeal

The next major development came in the case of Concord Township
Appeal.80 It is a case of the same genre as National Land since it also
deals with the successful challenge by a land developer of a large minimum
building lot requirement. Concord Township is important for two reasons: (1) it is an indorsement of the rationale of National Land; and (2)
it focused and made more explicit the approaches which were only implied
in National Land.
Appellee Kit-Mar Builders Inc. was the buying party to an agreement
to purchase 140 acres of undeveloped land in Concord Township, Delaware
County. Included in the agreement was a contingency that made the
transaction dependent upon a successful rezoning of the tract to permit
the construction of single family residences on one acre plots.8 ' After
attempts to secure the desired zoning change proved fruitless, Kit-Mar
announced that it would not seek to prove the hardship necessary to
secure a variance, but instead would directly attack the constitutionality
of the zoning ordinance as it applied to the property in question. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a four to three decision,8 2 adopted KitMar's argument in finding the ordinance unconstitutional under the test
3
set forth in National Land.
Concord Township is more than a reapplication of the rule of
National Land. Justice Roberts was explicit in stating that a two
or three acre minimum building lot requirement would, "absent some
extraordinary justification," be unreasonable.8 4 Justice Pomeroy, in his
dissenting opinion, indicated that the requirement of some "extraordinary
justification" has the effect of shifting the burden of proof from those
seeking to overturn the ordinance - who have always borne it - to the
township which is seeking to sustain the ordinance.8 5 If this is so, then
Concord Township is unquestionably a landmark holding. However, it is
submitted that to read Concord Township this way would in all probability
80. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970), rehearing denied, Sept. 14, 1970. The
referred-to case is entitled Concord Township Appeal in the official Pennsylvania
report, but in the Atlantic Reporter it is listed as Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.
81. At the time of the purchase agreement the tract was zoned to require lots of
no less than two acres along the existing roads and no less than three acres in the
interior. Id. at 469, 268 A.2d at 766.
82. Justice Jones filed a dissenting opinion joined in by Justice Cohen. Justice
Pomeroy filed a second dissenting opinion joined in by Justice Jones.
83. 439 Pa. at 469, 268 A.2d at 766.
84. Id. at 471, 268 A.2d at 767.

85. Id. at 496, 268 A.2d at 779.
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prove disastrous. A more accurate assessment of its effect would seem to
be that once the challenger has alleged that: (1) the zoning ordinance
as applied to his land is burdensome or that the ordinance is ultra vires
the statutory authority; and (2) the purpose or forseeable effect of the
ordinance is to limit population growth, then the zoning authority will
not be permitted to rest its case in whole or in part on the long accepted
presumption that the legislative action was in the best interests of the
community. Instead the zoning authority must now affirmatively demonstrate the justification, indeed the wisdom of their decision to limit population growth. It also seems clear that when, as in Concord Township, the
court calls for "some extraordinary justification", it can be read to mean
that as far as two and three acre minimum lot zoning is concerned, it will
be difficult to conceive a justifying circumstance.
If, as postulated, the zoning authority is forced to defend on the merits
any zoning decision the purpose or effect of which is to exclude population
growth, then an interesting question arises. The question is at what
point can the control of population density be reasonably related to the
health, safety, morals and general welfare of the community. Phrased
differently the question would be whether the zoning board can exclude any
residential land use short of row homes or multi-family dwellings. While
the precise answer to this question is at this point speculative, it would seem
that the constitutionally permissible limit in the urban fringe is something less than one acre.
This Comment has advanced the proposition that the court's search
for workable guidelines delineating the boundaries of the phrase "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" was in fact a quest for an objective
criteria against which to gauge the actions of local governments and their
administrative organs as an alternative to the presumption that the zoning
authority was acting in the best interests of the community. It was pointed
out that a reading of the cases disclosed a discernible propensity on the
part of the judiciary to require less evidence of a comprehensive plan
when the dispute involved an increase in land restriction - an up zoning
than was required when the change was a decrease in restriction - a
down zoning.8 6 Furthermore, it was supposed that this was done on the
premise that a down zoning of a particular property could involve favoritism
or worse, whereas in an up zoning the action of the zoning authority was
itself best evidence of the community's interests. It is submitted that the
rationale of National Land as extended and clarified by Concord Tdwnship,
is an abrogation of this latter presumption and the next logical step toward
a true adjudicative role in zoning disputes for Pennsylvania courts.
The reason behind the abrogation of the presumption as applied to up
zoning is not the same as the down zoning argument. In the discussion of
the rationale of National Land, it was suggested that the difference between
86. See supra at pp. 517-18 for discussion of the definitions which this Comment
has assigned to the terms "up zoning" and "down zoning."
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that result and the 1958 Bilbar decision was attributable to the re-evaluation
of the proper weight to be given to the third interest in the computation
of the balancing equation. The importance of this third interest is even more
apparent in Concord Township where the Court stated:
The implication of our decision in National Land is that communities must deal with the problems of population growth. They
may not refuse to confront the future by adopting zoning regulations
that effectively restrict population to near present levels. It is not for
any given township to say who may or may not live within its confines,
while disregarding the interests of the entire area. If Concord Township is successful in unnaturally limiting its population growth through
the use of exclusive zoning regulations, the people who would normally
live there will inevitably have to live in another community and the
requirement that they do so is 7not a decision that Concord Township
should alone be able to make.
It is the recognition of this non-resident interest which now prompts
the Court to say that a presumption in which a local government, unresponsive to the preferences of this third force, is held to be acting in the
best interest of this group is no less than absurdity.
Several other aspects of the Concord Township opinion corroborate
the view that its true decisional basis is an increasing judicial recognition
of the impact of local zoning determinations on non-local residents. For
example, the pecuniary interest of the land owner, Kit-Mar, is not even
mentioned. While it is fair to assume that the builder could realize a
greater profit at less risk through the sale of houses on one acre lots as
opposed to houses on three or even two acre lots, it is not necessarily
true that the potential profit realizable from the sale of fewer houses on
larger lots or that the risk attending the sale of a more expensive unit is
unreasonable or even considerable. In other words, the only pecuniary
loss which could be proved by Kit-Mar would be a slight reduction in
potential profit and even this reduced figure may have represented more
than just a reasonable profit. Unlike National Land, where the proven
pecuniary loss of the developer was used as a touchstone and was implicitly essential,88 the question is not even raised in Concord Township.
More worthy of note is the court's treatment of the arguments raised by
the township in defense of its zoning ordinance. The only objection given
serious consideration was the question of sewerage difficulties caused by
the increase in population density. This question was dismissed as irrelevant.8 9 The other justifications for the use of zoning to control population
growth including the ownership of only one bus by the township, the
rural character of the road network, and the desirability of preserving
87. Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 474-75, 268 A.2d 765, 768-69 (1970).
88. National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment,
419 Pa. 504, 525, 215 A.2d 597, 608 (1965). See discussion p. 521 supra.
89. 439 Pa. at 472, 268 A.2d at 767.
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the rural and historical surroundings of the neighborhood were dismissed
as merely "makeweight." 90
While the language of the court would seem to be dispositive of the
relevance of these aforementioned criteria, the enactment of the Municipaltities Planning Act of 1969,91 although inapplicable in the Concord Township controversy, raises many new questions which seem to negate its
holding. These questions and the statute, which is a revision of the
Pennsylvania zoning enabling laws, will be considered in Section VI of
this comment.
C.

92

Girsh Appeal

In a case decided the same week as Kit Mar, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was given the opportunity to develop the rationale of National
Land in a new context. In July of 1964, Joseph Girsh, a land developer,
agreed to purchase a 17 2 acre tract of land in Nether Providence Township, Delaware County, Pennsylvania. At the time of purchase the tract
was zoned "R-1 residential.193 Girsh's plan was to build on the land two,
nine story, high rise apartment houses each containing 216 units. Toward
this end, Girsh applied for a building permit which was denied because
his development plan violated the zoning code. He then appealed to the
zoning board of adjustment on the grounds that the ordinance was
unconstitutional. 94 The adverse decision of the board was upheld by the
Delaware County Common Pleas Court. On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the failure of the township's zoning scheme to
provide for apartments was, in fact, unconstitutional and reversed the
decree of the court below.
Before the supreme court, appellee-township focused their position on
two issues. First, the zoning ordinance of the township did not exclude
apartment uses because there existed procedures through which the landowner could, in special circumstances, alleviate an undue burden to himself. 95 Secondly, assuming arguendo the total exclusionary effect of the
Nether Providence zoning ordinance, this result was a proper exercise
of the local planning function. The court, in remaining consistent with its
established position on the proper function of the variance procedure9"
90. Id. at 472 n.5, 268 A.2d at 767 n.5.
91. PA. STAT. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Supp. 1970).
92. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), rehearing denied, April 13, 1970.
93. Id. at 239, 263 A.2d at 396. Under the terms of the Nether Providence Township Zoning Ordinance, R-1 residential permits the construction of single-family
residences on lots of not less than 20,000 square feet.
94. Id. at 240-41, 263 A.2d at 396-97. In directly challenging the Nether
Providence ordinance as being ultra vires the police power, Girsh relieved himself
of the burden of proving an unnecessary hardship, unique and particular to his piece
of property. He instead chose to prove the unreasonability of the ordinance as applied
to all the land in the township. See discussion pp. 509-11 supra.
95. Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 240-41, 263 A.2d 395, 396-97 (1970).
96. See discussion, note 25 supra.
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dismissed the initial argument in cursory fashion and turned to deal more
thoroughly with the legality of the total exclusion of apartments.
In ruling against the exclusion of apartments in this case the supreme
court used as precedent a line of cases holding other forms of total exclusions to be illegitimate uses of the police power. These included: (1)
an ordinance which prohibited quarrying anywhere in the township ;07 (2)
99
a total ban on flashing signs ;98 and (3) a total prohibition on billboards.
Just as these total prohibitions were declared invalid, the court found that
appellee-township could not have a zoning scheme which made no
reasonable provision for a legitimate land use such as apartment housing.
Reading the Girsh opinion in the perspective of other supreme court
zoning pronouncements leads with certainty to a conclusion that the real
decisional basis was not the compelling persuasiveness of analogs drawn
from quarrying, billboard and flashing light rulings, but was the concern for
the use of zoning as a device to deny future development. On this point
the court stated:
In refusing to allow apartment development as part of its zoning
scheme, appellee has in effect decided to zone out the people who
00
would be able to live in the Township if apartments were available.'
The danger of this zoning practice was again focused upon when Justice
Roberts stated that:
Nether Providence Township may not permissibly choose only to
take as many people as can live in single family housing, in effect
freezing the population at near present levels. Obviously if every
municipality took that view, population spread would be completely
frustrated.' 0'
A close examination of the Girsh case serves to reinforce the conclusions drawn from the previous analysis of the Kit-Mar decision, i.e.,
that even in the case of restrictive zoning the courts will no longer be content with the zoning authority basing their case upon an unrealistic presumption of validity as justification for their determinations. If this assessment
of the decision is correct, then many of the difficulties which spring to
mind upon the first reading of the decision become groundless. For example, if Girsh is a per se ban on total exclusions of a legitimate use then
despite Justice Roberts' protestations to the contrary, one would be hard
pressed under this rationale to deny a zoning change to a builder who
sought to erect a gas station in a residential neighborhood which was
located in a municipality that had zoned out gas stations as a permissible
97. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d
169 (1967).
98. Ammon R. Smith Co. Appeal, 423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d 683 (1966).
99. Norate Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965).
100. Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 242, 263 A.2d 395, 397 (1970).
101. Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398.
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use.10 2 On the other hand, however, if the gas station request is considered under the frustration of population growth test, denial of the
zoning change becomes more easily supported under the rationale that
despite the fact that the total ban on gas stations would seem to run
afoul of Girsh and supporting cases, if the purpose or effect of the use
restriction was not to deny progress then the township would be allowed
to advance the basis for their decision. If their justifications are sufficient
and there exists a comprehensive plan of development which rationally
excludes several uses, it seems reasonable to conclude that their arguments
would be sufficiently persuasive to obtain the approval of the court. Moreover, if one reads the rule from Girsh to mean simply that a community
can not exclude a legitimate residential use from its plan of development,
there is little to prevent the zoning board from amending its ordinance to
allow apartment uses in an area of the municipality already developed as
commercial. Such an obvious perversion of judicial intent would be within
the letter of the law under a per se rationale.
In addition, declining to interpret Girsh as per se prohibiting the total
exclusion of legitimate uses avoids a possible conflict between Girsh and
the traditional prohibition of spot zoning.' 0 To illustrate this conflict
,;uppose X, owner of a two acre plot in a residential area, desires to erect
u convalescent home on his property and that there were no such institutions in the community. Assume further that X's application for a building permit was denied and that he has appealed, citing as support for his
argument the rule from Girsh which states that local authority may not
totally prohibit a legitimate use. In opposition to X, the government and
the neighborhood landowners argue that to grant X's request would
necessitate a change in the zoning law for the benefit of a small piece of
property since this change is in no way justified by any change in environment or circumstance such a change would clearly be spot zoning. 10 4 This
dilemna may be avoided, however, by reading Girsh only as prohibiting
unreasonable population restrictions. Thus, if a municipality, in a similiar
situation, seeks to exclude a use such as a convalescent home from its plan
of development, it is submitted that under the above reading of Girsh
it may do so within the confines of reasonableness.
VI.

POSITIVE ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE

Prior to the series of cases which has been the subject of this Comment, the posture of the typical zoning board was that of straightforward
resistance to change. Under the restrictions developed by the Pennsylvania
102. The distinction between commercial and residential uses which Justice Roberts
is careful to point out, (437 Pa. at 245, 263 A.2d at 399), falters when it is realized
that the case law upon which the result is premised deals with the exclusion of
commercial uses.
103. See note 20 supra.
104. Id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 3
530

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

16

Supreme Court this resistance, although far from impossible, 10 5 will be
measurably more difficult. The criticism could be raised that the effect of
the large scale judicial intervention into land use planning has been to
create a power vacuum. The local zoning authority has been effectively
stripped of meaningful power, and in its place there has been left nothing.
The suburban ring will now develop without plan or meaning which
is the very evil that zoning was designed to avoid. While the criticism
raises a specter magnified beyond its realistic limits - the zoning authority
does indeed retain some substantial weapons for controlling development' °6
the premise of the thought seems basically correct. The supreme court
has significantly undermined the foundation of the local zoning board. In
the face of this change, if a zoning authority continues to pursue its
established policies through traditional means, it is going to become increasingly ineffectual.
By closing off the traditional avenues, the court has wrought change
capable of creating deep seated disruptions in our institutional arrangements.
However, the contribution of the court has not been entirely negative.
In Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. 10 7 the court recognized as constitutional the form of land use control known as planned unit development.108 In criticising the traditional zoning patterns the court said:
This [traditional] approach fares reasonably well so long as development takes place on a lot-by-lot basis, and so long as no one cares
that the overall appearance of the municipality resembles the design
achieved by using a cookie cutter on a sheet of dough. However, with
the increasing popularity of large scale residential developments, particularly in suburban areas, it has become apparent to many local
municipalities that land can be more efficiently used, and developments
more aesthetically pleasing, if zoning regulations focus on density requirements rather than on specific rules for each individual lot. Under
density zoning, the legislature determines what percentages of a particular district must be devoted to open space, for example, and what
percentage used for dwelling units. The task of filling in the particular
district with real houses and real open spaces than falls upon the
planning commission usually working in conjunction with an individual
large scale developer.' 0 9
105. The zoning power is, of course, only slightly eroded. In addition, other
regulatory weaponry is available to the governing body, e.g., building codes, road
capacities and health regulations including sewerage requirements, (both storm sewer
and waste sewer capacities are limited), and waste disposal facilities. These tools,
although they can not permanently prevent expansion and growth, can effectively
retard it.

106. Id.
107. 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
108. See Zucker & Wolffe, Supreme Court Legalizes PUD: New Hope from
New Hope, 2 LAND USE CONTROLS 32 (1968). The innovative feature of planned

unit development (called alternatively planned residential unit development) is its
rejection of the old pattern of single-family detached residences on uniform "cookiecutter" lots in favor of cluster development, townhouses, and other techniques resulting in more closely spaced dwellings with provision for open space and recreational
areas to be used by all residents jointly. See generally, Symposium, Planned Unit

Development, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1965).

109. Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 629-30, 241 A.2d 81,
83 (1968).
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Beyond this the court in Concord Township Appeal" made reference to
the desirability of experimenting with the innovative and imaginative
developmental schemes available for effective planning."'
The true answer to the zoning dilemma lies in effective legislative
action" 2 and not with the judiciary. The abuses which have grown up are
far too extensive to lend themselves to judicial correction. 1 1 In Pennsylvania there has been a limited attempt at legislative reform. The Municipalties Planning Act of 1969114 represents an attempt to provide a more
flexible framework for dealing with the increasing complexity of zoning
schemes. Among other provisions" the new act provides a specific framework for the implementation of a scheme of planned unit development," 6
and a section expanding the permissable purposes for which a governing
body may zone. 117 Unfortunately, these limited reforms do not fit the
malady. What is needed is an extensive restructuring, i.e., a regional approach, rather than alteration of the present form.
110. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
111. Id. at 475, 268 A.2d at 769. Examples of devices designed to increase zoning
flexibility include the conditional grant of special exceptions, variances, and rezoning
amendments. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 8.17-8.21
(1968).

112. Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 241 A.2d 765 (1970).

The court

explicitly recognized this fact in saying:
We fully realize the overall solution to these problems lies with greater regional
planning; but until the time comes that we have such a system we must confront
the situation as it is. The power currently resides in the hands of each local
governing unit, and we will not tolerate their abusing that power in attempting
to zone out growth at the expense of neighboring communities.
Id. at 476, 241 A.2d 769.
113. It has been charged that:
(1) Excessive zoning restrictions and subdivision standards interfere with
construction of low and moderate-cost housing.
(2) Land-use regulations have failed to halt wasteful urban sprawl.
(3) Zoning for large lots is used to prevent Negroes from living in the
suburbs.
(4) Zoning favors are for sale by public officials in many communities.
(5) Land-use regulation has become so complex that it cannot properly be
administered by laymen - city councils, planning commissions, boards
of zoning appeals.
(6) Archaic and rigid zoning ordinances prevent the use of design innovations such as cluster subdivisions, which could provide higher standards
of amenity and bring housing within the reach of families that cannot
now afford it.
(7) Zoning is not adequate to guide or regulate urban development.
(8) Local government actions in land-use regulation are often against the
public interests of the metropolitan region.
(9) Zoning has never been able to carry out a comprehensive plan.
(10) Zoning and subdivision regulations are used primarily to correct the
fiscal problems of local government and not to guide urban expansion in
an efficient pattern. (This is called fiscal zoning.)
AMERICAN

REGULATION

SOCIETY

OF PLANNING

OFFICIALS,

PROBLEMS OF ZONING AND

LAND-USE

(1968).

114. PA. STAT. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Supp. 1970).
115. See generally Wolffe, An Analysis of the New Zoning and Planning Act,
42 TEMP. L.Q. 420 (1969), for a sectional comparison of the new act with the old.
116. PA. STAT. tit. 53, §§ 10701-12 (Supp. 1970).
117. Id. at § 10604.
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As an alternative to a regional approach, the needed restructuring
could be implemented through a consolidation involving the reorganization
of the 2600 local governmental units in the state of Pennsylvania.11
Should the impetus provided by the Court's active intervention into
land use control prove insufficient to supply the needed legislative reform,
other more drastic judicial approaches are available. It has been suggested
that the current zoning patterns are invalid because, in operation, they
have resulted in discrimination against the poor and racial minorities on a
scale amounting to a violation of their constitutional right to equal
protection under the law. 110 Another commentator postulates that the
operation of the zoning structure is an unconstitutional disenfranchisment of
20
substantial segments of the populace.'
The trend is clear, however, that suburban zoning, as conceived in the
1920's, is not capable of dealing with the expanding population and technological innovations of the present day. Its deleterious effects of: (1)
oppression of huge blocs of the constituency; (2) ecological blight; and
(3) needless waste of valuable land, have reached intolerable proportions.
Change must come, and should the legislative and executive branches
2
continue to be recalcitrant, the courts in Pennsylvania and elsewhere1 '
will be forced to further inject themselves into the major role of reform.
John W. Nilon Jr.
118. REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION FOR MODERN STATE GOVERNMENT (1969).
Among other reforms the Commission recommended consolidation of the 2600 local
governmental units.
119. Sager Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); Note, Suburban Zoning Ordinances and
Building Codes: Their Effect on Low and Moderate-Income Housing, 45 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 123 (1969).
120. Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970).
121. See Johnston, Developments in Land Use Control, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW.
399 (1970).
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